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Abstract
We present a model in which a sovereign country optimally decides
on its consumption and investment policies as well as on the optimal
time to default. In the paper we allow the sovereign borrower to keep
the fraction of its augmented wealth in so-called international reserves.
We further assume that these reserves can be deposited at the risk-
free rate. In this framework, we obtain analytical solutions for optimal
consumption and investment rules, as well as formulas for optimal
default boundary and the value of the risky loan. In the paper we
assume that in the case of default the lender can impose economic and
political sanctions against the borrower and also can seize an implicit
collateral. We show that when the country is getting very close to
its default wealth level, then its relative risk aversion decreases and
the country increases its consumption rate and the risky investment
fraction at the expense of available liquid reserves.
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Sovereign countries may apply for external ￿nancing for diﬀerent reasons.
Some of them may want to expend the scale of the investment in projects
or technologies they are already running or going to undertake or estab-
lish. Others may need extra funds to cover their budget de￿cit, that is for
consumption. We construct a model in which the sovereign borrower en-
dogenously derives his optimal consumption and investment policies. Our
model is based on a key assumption that the country not only consumes
and invests in the risky technology, but also keeps a fraction of its wealth in
so-called international reserves. These reserves are created for consumption
smoothing purposes and, by assumption, can be invested or deposited at the
risk-free rate. This assumption makes our model conceptually diﬀerent from
other studies - in fact we allow for the existence and optimal management
of international reserves.
Under this assumption we study the behavior of the sovereign borrower
who has only one single borrowing opportunity. That is, we do not allow for
repeated borrowing in our model, and we consider a static debt contract.
This implies that the borrower gets more discretion over the way he spends
borrowed funds since the reputation eﬀect vanishes. When a debt contract is
signed, the sovereign country decides upon its consumption and investment
policies and the time of default without any possibilities for the lender to
interfere. However, in order to sustain positive lending, we assume that if the
borrower defaults, the lender can impose economic and political sanctions
and can seize a fraction of borrower￿s assets.
The above assumptions, among few others, are widely used in the liter-
ature on sovereign lending. The idea is that there must be some incentives
for the sovereign country, which can hide behind its sovereignty, to respect
the debt service. If a country decides to default, and hence refuses to pay
a contractual coupon, then costly and lengthy renegotiations usually take
place since there is no well establish bankruptcy procedure. This is the main
diﬀerence between a sovereign and a corporate debt contract. The latter is
an enforceable contract due to the presence of the bankruptcy code, for in-
stance Chapter 11 in the USA. If a corporation fails on its debt obligations,
then the bankruptcy procedure is well de￿ned and the lender can have access
to the assets of the borrower.
In sovereign debt models, the partial access to the assets of the defaulted
borrower is usually taken by assumption. In reality, however, it can be
quite problematic and costly for the lender to seize borrower￿s assets and
transform them into cash. The parties rather begin to negotiate over the
2strategic debt service or partial debt relief. In the paper, we also allow
the parties to negotiate when the sovereign borrower fails to provide the
contractual coupon payment.
Our model is much in line with one of Chang and Sundaresan (2000). In
their paper, a sovereign country uses its wealth for consumption purposes
and investment in its risky technology. When maximizing the expected util-
ity from life-time consumption, a country endogenously decides upon the
default boundary as well as upon the re-borrowing boundary. The authors
also derive the diﬀerential equation the value a risky loan must satisfy. How-
ever, in their model all the results are numerical ones.
The major diﬀerence between our study and the one of Chang and Sun-
daresan is driven by the risk free lending opportunity for the borrower in
our model. Even though their model allows for the dynamic borrowing, it
does not seem problematic to extend our model to the dynamic setting by
using the technique of Chang and Sundaresan (2000). Interestingly, in our
framework the sovereign country is in the role of a risky borrower and a
risk-free lender simultaneously. The introduction of the possibility for the
sovereign country to manage its reserves allows us to derive explicit and im-
plicit analytical solutions for the value function, optimal consumption and
investment rules, the default boundary and the value of the risky loan.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we provide a
brief literature review. In section 3, we present the setup of the model were
we basically describe the rationale for the country to become a borrower and
a lender simultaneously. We also present there the timing of the model. In
section 4, we solve the borrower￿s optimization problem before he defaults
and also during the renegotiation period. In section 5, the value of the risky
loan as well as the contractual coupon value are derived. Section 6 presents
some numerical results and section 7 concludes the paper.
2L i t e r a t u r e o v e r v i e w
Many studies have addressed the issue of the sovereign lending from diﬀerent
perspectives. Very generally, there are two approaches in the literature to
study the rationale for sovereign lending or borrowing.
The ￿rst approach is based on the assumption that a sovereign borrower
values his reputation if he wants to have an access to the credit market in the
future. Models which deal with this approach assume that the borrower who
once defaults is unable to enter into another ￿nancial agreement. Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) build a reputation based model to explain the rationale for
3sovereign lending. They consider a sovereign borrower who maximizes utility
from consumption and uses external funds to share the risk of his domestic
production technology. In their model, it is assumed that default leads to the
exclusion of the borrower from the world credit market. The authors show
that under certain conditions reputation eﬀect allows for positive lending
equilibrium. However, Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989b) argue that if cutting oﬀ
future loans is the lender￿s sole threat, then there is no lending equilibrium
if the borrower is able to enter cash-in-advance agreements.
The second approach considers economic and political sanctions as a
main threat of the lender in the case of default. Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a)
consider economic and political sanctions which may be imposed by the
lender as an instrument to achieve a positive lending equilibrium. Gibson
and Sundaresan (2000) model penalties as a seizure of the borrower￿s exports
combined with economic sanctions. They assume that borrowings are used
to generate exports, which in turn will partially serve as a collateral. In our
paper, we make the same assumptions about sanctions and seize of collateral
as main instruments to hurt the defaulted borrower, but we do not model
exports explicitly.
Chang and Sundaresan (2000) present a continuous time model which
allows for repeated borrowing and sanctions. In their paper, default is fol-
lowed by renegotiations during which the borrower pays a strategic coupon.
Renegotiations last until the borrower recovers from the distress and resumes
to pay a contractual coupon or until the lenders unilaterally terminates ne-
gotiations. The latter happens at the low wealth level of the borrower when
the strategic coupon which the lender receives is equal to his bargaining
cost. Chang and Sundaresan also indicate under which circumstances the
sovereign country will be willing to re-borrow. In the paper they derive the
optimal default boundary as well as the optimal re-borrowing boundary. In
our paper, we use a framework of Chang and Sundaresan, but we do not
model re-borrowing opportunities. Instead, we allow the sovereign country
to keep a fraction of its wealth in the international reserves.
There are a few studies which address the issue of sovereign credit spread
estimation. Gibson and Sundaresan (2000) show that in the framework of
their model sovereign credit spreads are strictly grater than spreads of an
otherwise identical corporate debt contract. They obtain that both sovereign
and corporate credit spreads are increasing convex functions of the coupon
rate and inversely related to the level of the risk-free rate. Westphalen
(2001) presents a ￿nite horizon continuous time model of rescheduling of
debt following a sovereign default as a bond exchange. He obtains, as we
do, closed form solutions for the default boundary, the value of the bond
4and credit spreads.
Duﬃe, Pedersen and Singleton (2003) construct a reduced form model
for pricing sovereign debt and estimate the model using Russian dollar-
denominated bonds. Along with credit spreads estimation, the authors
study the determinants of Russian yield spreads which are: budget de￿cit,
current account, reserves of hard currency and the required future debt ser-
vice. One of their major ￿ndings indicates that Russian yield spreads are
negatively correlated with the country￿s foreign currency reserves and the
oil price. Our model is able to explain this empirical fact when the country
is close to its default boundary: credit spreads move up and the level of the
country￿s international reserves decreases substantially because of increased
probability of strategic default.
3 The setup of the model
We consider a production type economy in which there is one single good
which serves as a numeraire and which is used for consumption and invest-
ment purposes by all agents in the economy. Thus, consumption and wealth
are measured in units of the numeraire.
We study the interaction between a representative lender and the bor-
rower with initial wealth x0. In our model this particular borrower is a
￿small￿ (in a sense of wealth) sovereign country which cannot aﬀect the
world risk-free rate. This interaction takes place in a full information set-
ting, i.e. the lender knows (or can perfectly monitor) all the characteristics
(actions) of the borrower, and vice-versa.
The sovereign borrower seeks to augment his initial endowment x0 by
applying for external ￿nancing. Whether the borrowing takes place or not,
the borrower is assumed to use his wealth for consumption purposes (for
instance to service the country￿s budget) and for investments. To keep
things simple, we assume that investment opportunities are restricted by
only two technologies.
The ￿rst one is the borrower￿s own (or domestic) risky production tech-
nology an investments of qt in which instantaneously yields:
dqt
qt
= ￿dt + σdZt
where ￿ and σ are the instantaneous return and its standard deviation re-
spectively, both are positive constants. Zt is a standard Brownian Motion
on the underlying probability space (Ω,F,P) which describes all the un-
certainty in the production process. This risky technology models a total
5country￿s stock and it incorporates all the production the government of
a sovereign is managing or is responsible for, including the production of
export oriented products.
The second investment technology constitutes the possibility for the
sovereign borrower to lend at the risk-free rate. The assumption about
the existence of this riskless investment opportunity drives a wedge between
our study and the one of Chang and Sundaresan (2000). By introducing the
second technology, we simply assume the following. Apart from consump-
tion and investment in the risky technology, the sovereign borrower keeps
a fraction of his wealth in ￿reserves￿ for consumption smoothing purposes.
This can re￿ect, for instance, liquid international reserves of the country￿s
National Bank. As an example, in Table 1 we present statistical ￿gures for
gross international reserves of the Russian Federation for years 1996-2001.
As it is indicated, the foreign exchange assets constitute the major part of
the country￿s international reserves. Also, these assets accounted for 2.7%
in 1996 and nearly 11% in 2001 of the country￿s GDP. Moreover, from the
de￿nition of the foreign exchange assets, it makes sense to consider their
default risk as negligible. Therefore, we assume that liquid international
reserves of the sovereign borrower yield a constant risk-free rate r, such that
r<￿ .In our model, optimal consumption, optimal investment in the risky
technology as well as the optimal size of the borrower￿s international reserves
will be derived endogenously.
At time 0, the sovereign country considers the possibility to augment
its initial wealth. Suppose that it has incentives to borrow from abroad by
signing a debt contract of the form (I∗, ﬂ C(I∗))1, where I∗ is the amount
borrowed and ﬂ C is the corresponding coupon. In the paper we consider a
perpetual debt contract, i.e. there is no repayment of the principal amount
of the loan, but the borrower commits to pay to the lender a perpetual
continuous coupon ￿ow ﬂ C(I∗), w h e r et h ev a l u eo f ﬂ C(I∗)i sd e ￿ned endoge-
nously in our model. We also assume that this borrowing technology is
static, i.e. the borrower can augment his wealth via external ￿nancing only
once. Therefore, after the debt contract (I∗, ﬂ C(I∗)) is signed, the notion
of ￿reputation￿ vanishes for the borrower. We also assume that the initial
wealth of the sovereign country is not that high that it can be treated as
a ￿safe￿ borrower. Hence, the debt contract we just described encounters
credit risk and the initial yield of the loan must be above the risk-free rate
r.
1The country￿s insentive to sign such a countract will be formalized in Assumption 1
in section 4.
6Table 1. Gross International Reserves of the Russian Federation
2 (in billions of US$)
GDP Gold and foreign    of which 
(nominal) exchange reserves foreign exchange assets Gold 
(% of GDP)
31.12.1996 419.0 15.3 11.3 2.7% 4.0
31.12 1997 436.0 17.8 12.8 2.9% 4.9
31.12.1998 282.4 12.2 7.8 2.8% 4.4
31.12.1999 193.2 12.5 8.5 4.4% 4.0
31.12.2000 251.1 28.0 24.3 9.7% 3.7
31.12.2001 302.2 36.6 32.5 10.8% 4.1
          Sources: The Central Bank of Russian Federation, Datastream
If at a certain point of time the borrower is unable or unwilling to respect
the contractual coupon payment of ﬂ C, we will call this event as default. If
this event occurs, following Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a), Gibson and Sun-
daresan (2000) we assume that the lender can penalize the country in the
following ways:
First, the lender can impose political or economic sanctions against the
borrower, which in turn will result in the future reduction of the borrower￿s
risky technology growth rate from ￿ to ￿ ￿3, ￿ ￿<￿ .For example, if the
borrower￿s production heavily relies on some particular import products (like
energy resources, raw materials, etc.), the lender may have the possibility to
in￿uence the supply side of these products, and hence to hurt the borrower.
The lender may also have the possibility to impose some trade barriers such
that the borrower￿s exports, and thus revenues, will diminish.
Second, the lender can seize some assets of the borrower. Namely, the
lender can expropriate a fraction β of the borrower￿s wealth at the time of
default. One could think that via a certain legal procedure (like a trial in
an international court) the lender can get an access to the borrower￿s as-
sets abroad, for instance borrower￿s exports, like in Gibson and Sundaresan
(2000), or some other tangible assets. However, we assume that the lender
cannot get an access to the international reserves of the borrower when the
2The international reserves are highly liquid ￿nancial assets that the Bank of Russia
and Ministry of Finance have at their disposal on the reporting date. The international
reserves are made up of monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDR), reserve position at
the IMF and foreign exchange assets. The foreign exchange assets includes the Bank
of Russias and Ministry of Finances foreign exchange assets in the form of cash, reverse
repo with nonresidents, bank deposits at nonresident banks (having not less than A rating
by the classi￿cation of the Fitch IBCA and Standard and Poors or A2 by the classi￿cation
of the Moodys) as well as government and other securities issued by nonresidents with
a similar rating. Starting from September 1, 1999, a sum equivalent to the balances in
foreign currency on the correspondent accounts of resident banks in the Bank of Russia is
deducted from the above assets except the funds allocated by the Bank of Russia to the
Vneshekonombank for servicing the government foreign debt.
3We assume that ￿ ￿ remains above the risk-free rate, ￿ ￿>r .
7borrower defaults4. Therefore, the borrower is aware that when he defaults,
the fraction β (0 < β < 1) of his wealth can be lost. Hence, by signing a
debt contract, the lender receives an implicit collateral.
The wealth level W∗ at which the sovereign country decides to default
will be derived endogenously. Namely, at this wealth level the borrower
becomes indiﬀerent between continuing to service debt, i.e. to pay coupon
ﬂ C, and defaulting. In the paper, we assume that after default the sovereign
borrower and the lender negotiate over the strategic debt service or, in
other words, over strategic coupon ￿ow. In general, the outcome of such
kind of negotiations depends on the bargaining power of the parties. On
the contrary to Chang and Sundaresan (2000), in our paper we assume that
the lender does not hold all the bargaining power during the renegotiations,
but he can rather extract only a fraction α < 1o ft h em a x i m u mc o u p o n
Smax(W) the borrower can pay at his wealth level W.T h em a x i m a lc o u p o n
Smax(W) lies on the boundary when the borrower is indiﬀerent between
paying this coupon and paying nothing (but accepting penalties). Since the
reputation has no value for the country, the sovereign borrower will not enter
renegotiations if α =1 , i.e. when the lender has all the bargaining power. In
Chang and Sundaresan (2000) the sovereign country is willing to negotiate
under the latter condition, because in their model the country values future
re-borrowing opportunities.
We denote the strategic coupon the borrower pays during the renegoti-
ation period by S(W), and by assumption it is equal to5:
S(W)=αSmax(W).
Therefore, during renegotiations, the lender receives a strategic coupon
S(W), and the amount
Smax(W) − S(W)=( 1− α)Smax(W)
is left for the borrower in order for him to continue negotiations. In our
model, the bargaining power parameter α is set exogenously, however it
must be suﬃciently high for the lender to have incentives to enter renego-
tiation rather than ￿liquidate￿ the borrower at W∗. The maximum coupon
Smax(W) the borrower can pay during the renegotiation period will be de-
rived endogenously. We also assume that negotiations are costly for the
4As our numerical solutions indicate, this assumption is not very restrictive because
the volume of international reserves approaches zero when the country is very close to
default
5Chang and Sunsaresan (2000) assume that the lender holds all the bargaining power
during the renegotiations, and thus in their model S(W)=S
max(W).
8lender and he bears a bargaining cost of bc per unit of time. In our model
renegotiations end when either the country recovers from the ￿nancial dis-
tress and resumes to pay the contractual coupon ﬂ C, or the borrower￿s econ-
omy experiences series of negative shocks and his wealth reaches the point
W∗ when the net cash in￿ow to the lender (S(W∗) − bc) becomes equal to
zero. In the latter case, the lender unilaterally triggers sanctions and seizes
the collateral. We call the corresponding event as total default and derive
the trigger wealth level W∗ endogenously.















Continuation W>W ∗ x0 + I∗ ￿ ﬂ C
Renegotiation W∗ <W<W∗ W∗ ￿S (W)
Total default W<W ∗ (1 − β)W∗ ￿ ￿ 0
Now, we specify the characteristics and the optimization problem of the
sovereign borrower.
4 The borrower￿s optimization problem





, γ > 1
After the debt contract (I∗, ﬂ C(I∗)) is signed, the augmented wealth of the
sovereign becomes equal to x0+I∗. It is assumed that from this point on the
lender has no possibilities to in￿uence or intervene the actions the borrower
undertakes, unless the latter defaults.
Therefore, the borrower solves his consumption-investment problem and
strategically decides on the time, or equivalently on the wealth level, of
default. At time 0, the value function of the sovereign can be written as:






9where the controls c,w, and W∗ denote consumption, the fraction of the
wealth to be invested in the risky technology and the optimal default bound-
ary (i.e. the wealth level at which the sovereign defaults), respectively; ρ is
the subjective discount factor. A is a set of admissible controls:
A = {(ct,w t):ct ≥ 0 ∧ wt ∈ [0,1] ∀t ≥ 0}
This optimization problem implies that at each point of time t the frac-
tion (1−wt) of borrower￿s current wealth to be kept in reserves is derived6.
By assumption, the reserves are invested at the risk-free rate. We should
notice that this riskless investment is restricted: a) by the country￿s current
wealth from above, that is the short selling of the risky production technol-
ogy is not allowed, and b) by zero from below, that is the sovereign cannot
borrow money at the risk-free rate due to its default risk.
To proceed further, we make the following assumptions about the initial
wealth and the ￿nancial parameters of the model.
Assumption 1. In order for a positive debt contract (I∗, ﬂ C(I∗)) to
exist, we assume that, given the initial wealth of the sovereign country x0,
the ￿nancial parameters of the model and the borrowed amount I∗ are such
that
a) the sovereign country has incentives to borrow, i.e.
J(x0 + I∗) >J 0(x0)
where J0 is the country￿s value function in autarky.
b) the lender has incentives to lend:
x0 + I∗ >W∗
The above inequality requires for the augmented wealth to be above the de-
fault boundary. In other words, this condition precludes immediate default.
Assumption 2. Financial parameters ￿,r,σ and γ are such that the
r i s k - f r e ei n v e s t m e n ti sf e a s i b l ef o rt h eb o r r o w e ra ta n yw e a l t hl e v e l .N a m e l y ,




6Notice that according to our de￿nition of the admissible strategy, this fraction can
become very small, whereas a country￿s central bank may be forced to ful￿lac e r t a i n
minimum requirement on the level of international reserves. However, the incorporation
of this constraint will not allow us to solve the model analytically.
7This assumption will supports the existence of interior optima when we solve the
borrower￿s optimization problem.
10To solve the borrower￿s optimization problem (1), we proceed in the fol-
lowing way. First, we consider the problem the sovereign borrower is facing
when he totally defaults. Since there are no future borrowing possibilities,
this problem is equivalent to the one when the borrower stays in autarky.
Then, we formulate the initial optimization problem and the one during the
negotiation period.
4.1 The sub-problem after total default
When wealth of the sovereign country reaches the total default boundary
W∗, the lender imposes economic and political sanctions, which result in
the reduction of the economy￿s growth rate from ￿ to ￿ ￿, and seizes im-
plicit collateral which is worth βW∗. In this case, the sovereign solves its
consumption-investment problem with the corresponding value function:






and the wealth dynamics:
dWt =[ ( wt(￿ ￿ − r)+r)Wt − ct]dt + wtσWtdZt,t > 0( 3 )
W(0) = (1 − β)W∗
From the theory of dynamic programming it follows that given the wealth
dynamics (3), the value function (2) satis￿es the following HJB equation8:
0= m a x
c,w
{U(c) − ρ ￿ J + ￿ JW [(w(￿ ￿ − r)+r)W − c]+
1
2
￿ JWW σ2w2W2} (4)
The explicit analytical solution to the above equation gives the formula for






￿ c∗(W)=( ￿ JW)
− 1
γ = ￿ δW
￿ w∗ = −
￿ JW
￿ JWW W




￿ ￿ − r
σ2
where ￿ δ = 1
γ[ρ +( γ − 1)(r + 1
2γ(
￿ ￿−r
σ )2)]. Note that both ￿ c∗ and ￿ w∗ are
admissible: ￿ c∗ ≥ 0 because ￿ δ > 09, and ￿ w∗ ∈ (0,1) because of Assumption 2
8This equation is obtained by the application of the stochastic dynamic programming
technique (see, for example Fleming and Rishel (1975)). For details on the derivation of
this HJB equation, see, for example, Merton (1971, 1990).
9Since γ is assumed to be greater then 1, it follows that ￿ δ > 0.
11and the fact that r<￿ ￿<￿ . We can see that after total default, the optimal
consumption and investment rules of the borrower, given that he will not
be able to borrow in the future, coincide with the classical Merton￿s (1971)
solution: the borrower consumes at a constant rate ￿ δ and invests a constant
fraction (often called as Merton￿s rate) of his current wealth in the risky
technology. He keeps the rest in international reserves and invests them at
the risk-free rate by assumption.
Let us notice that equation (5) also gives a formula for the country￿s




where δ = 1




4.2 The initial optimization problem
Now, having de￿ned the value function of the borrower after total default,
his initial value function J(W) can be written as:





e−ρtU(ct)dt + e−ρτ∗ ￿ J(W∗)
#
(7)
where W∗ is the default boundary and τ∗ is the corresponding stopping
time. ￿ J(W) is the value function of the borrower during the renegotiation
period.




(w(￿ − r)+r)W(t) − ct − ﬂ C
⁄
dt + wσW(t)dZt,t < τ∗ (8)
W(0) = x0 + I∗
where ﬂ C is a contractual coupon ￿ow. In this section we treat it as exoge-
nously given, but in the next section we derive its value endogenously, i.e.
ﬂ C = ﬂ C(I∗).
We assert that the sovereign borrower￿s value function (7), given the
wealth dynamics (8), is the unique C2(W∗,∞) solution of the following
HJB equation10:
0=m a x
c,w {U(c)+JW [(w(￿ − r)W − c]+
1
2
JWWσ2w2W2} − ρJ +( rW − ﬂ C)JW
(9)
10See, for example, Chang and Sundaresan (1999)
12with boundary and initial conditions:











J(W)= l i m
W→∞
J0(W) = 0 (9.3)
Problem (9)-(9.3) is a free boundary problem which simultaneously yields
the solution for the value function J and the default boundary W∗. The
boundary condition (9.1) is a value matching condition which says that at
the default boundary the borrower is indiﬀerent between continuing to ser-
vice debt with coupon ﬂ C and entering into renegotiations. Equation (9.2)
is a smooth-pasting condition which ensures the optimality of the default
boundary W∗. Moreover, this condition also ensures continuity of consump-
tion at the default boundary (we will consider this problem below in more
details). The last condition (9.3) describes the asymptotic property of the
value function: when the wealth of the country tends to in￿nity, then de-
fault probability tends to zero, and hence the country behaves like being in
autarky11.
Assuming that interior optima in equation (9) exist12,w eu s et h e￿rst-

















+( rW − ﬂ C)JW +m a x
c {U(c) − cJW} (11)
Now we use the ￿rst-order condition with respect to consumption c:
JW = U0(c)=U0(c(W)) (12)
11When wealth approaches in￿nity, the relative coupon tends to zero, and thus can be
neglected.
12The derived numerical solutions will justify this assumption. However, in the renego-
tiation period, it is justi￿ed by Assumption 2.
13The optimality condition for consumption (12) appears to be a reference
equation for all the transformations we make below. In fact, we are going
to switch from wealth to optimal consumption as an exogenous variable by
implementing the technique of Karatzas, Lehoczky et al. (1986)13.
Diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to W, we get
JWW = U00(c)c0(W) (12.1)








It makes sense to assume that the consumption function c(W) is strictly
increasing in wealth, and hence it has an inverse function which we denote
by X(c). By de￿nition of an inverse function we write
X(c(W)) = W (14)
and
X0(c)c0(W)=1 a n d X00(c)
£
c0(W)
⁄2 + X0(c)c00(W) = 0 (15)
Then, the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the production technol-
















rX − c − ﬂ C
⁄
+ U(c) (17)
Now, by diﬀerentiating both sides of (17) with respect to consumption c, we



















rX − c − ﬂ C
⁄
(18)
13In order to use this technique, one must require from the utility function to be sepa-
rable. Obviously, this requirement is satis￿ed in our case.
14Observe that we transformed the original Bellman equation (9) to the new
equation (18) which is expressed in terms of optimal consumption c as a
new exogenous variable and its inverse function X(c)s o l v e st h i se q u a t i o n .
Remembering, that U(c)=c1−γ












cX0(c) − γ2rX(c)+γ2(c + ﬂ C)=0
(19)
where λ =( ￿ − r)/σ. We postulate the partial solution to equation (19)
of the form X0(c)=v1c + v2 and ￿nd constants v1 and v2 by substituting































is of the form:
Xh(c)=Ac−γh− + Bc−γh+
where h−,h + are the roots of the characteristic equation:λ2
2 h2 − (r − ρ −
λ2
2 )h − r =0 . Notice, that the roots of this equation are of diﬀerent signs:
we assign h− (h+) to the negative (positive) one. Therefore, the general
solution to equation (19) is:
X(c)=Ac−γh− + Bc−γh+ + X0(c)
where A and B are unknown parameters. Experience suggests that the









The constant B (required to be negative) will be de￿ned later. Using (14),









15Unfortunately, the above equation cannot be inverted. However, it implicitly
presents optimal consumption as a function of wealth in the continuation
region.
Given that optimal consumption serves as a new exogenous variable, we




e−ρtU(ct)dt + e−ρτ∗ ￿ J(W∗)
#
Applying Ito￿s lemma, we derive the stochastic process for optimal con-
sumption:




Using (14),(15),(16) and the expression for the wealth dynamics (8), the

















Notice that the above equation guarantees the non-negativity of consump-
tion14.
Applying the dynamic programming principle, the Bellman equation for









Substituting the expression (22) for dc we arrive to the second-order linear
diﬀerential equation. The procedure for solving this equation is similar to
the one presented above. We postulate the general solution to equation (23)
of the form:





14The solution to the linear stochastic diﬀerential equation (22) is:














16where as before h+ (h−) is a positive (negative) root of the equation λ2
2 h2−
(r − ρ − λ2
2 )h − r =0 .
Discarding the term c−γk− (because of condition (9.3)) and following
Karatzas,Lehoczky et al. (1986) (Theorem 9.1) we obtain the expression for












where optimal consumption and investment policies are de￿ned by (21) and
(16) respectively.
We are going to de￿ne the unknown parameter B and the optimal default
boundary W∗ by using boundary conditions (9.1) and (9.2). But ￿rst we
have to solve for the value function during the renegotiation period ￿ J(W).
4.3 The sub-problem during the renegotiation period
During the renegotiation period the borrower and the lender decide upon
the strategic debt service. As it was already mentioned, the lender can
extract only a fraction α, 0 < α < 1, of the maximum coupon Smax(W)t h e
borrower is willing to pay given his wealth is equal to W, W < W ∗. However,
the fraction α must be high enough such that the lender has incentives to
enter negotiations rather than to ￿liquidate￿ the contract, i.e. to trigger
sanctions and to seize the collateral. This implies that the value of the risky
loan at the default boundary I(W∗), where I(W)i sd e ￿ned in section 5, is
greater than βW∗, the amount the lender gets in the case of ￿liquidation￿.
In order to de￿ne the maximum coupon ￿ow Smax(W), we use the tech-
nique from Chang and Sundaresan (2000). If during the renegotiation period
the debt service is equal to Smax(W), then the corresponding value function
of the borrower must satisfy the following HJB equation:
0=m a x
c,w {U(c)+ ￿ Jmax





− ρ ￿ Jmax +( rW − Smax(W)) ￿ Jmax
W
On the other hand, during renegotiations the sovereign borrower has an
option to repudiate debt and to accept ￿liquidation￿ consequences. The
maximal coupon payment the country is going to provide is such that it
becomes indiﬀerent between continuing to service debt in a strategic way
and exercising the option. Put it formally, it must be that:















￿ JW((1 − β)W)
·− 1














Substituting expressions for ￿ Jmax(W), c∗ and w∗ into (25) we obtain the









W ≡ sW (27)
Given that the borrower will pay only a fraction α of Smax(W) during
renegotiations, the HJB equation for the true value function ￿ J(W)i st h e
following:
0=m a x
c,w {U(c)+ ￿ JW [(w(￿ − r)W − c]+
1
2
￿ JWWσ2w2W2} − ρ ￿ J +( r − αs)W ￿ JW
(28)
Proceeding in a traditional way, i.e. deriving ￿rst-order conditions and then
substituting obtained expressions for ￿ c∗ and ￿ w∗ back into (28), we obtain a







where ￿ δ = 1
γ
h





. Substituting further the value for
s, which is de￿n e di n( 2 7 ) ,w eg e t :
￿ δ = δ − α
h




Therefore, in the renegotiation period, the borrower￿s value function is given
by equation (29) and optimal consumption and investment strategies are
described by:





Following Chang and Sundaresan (2000), we assume that the renegoti-
ation process is costly for the lender, and that he bears a bargaining cost
18of bc per unit of time. Hence, the lender will accept the strategic coupon
payments S(W) until the point when his net cash in￿ow is equal to zero:
S(W) − bc = αSmax(W∗) − bc =0
In this case, namely when the borrower￿s wealth drops to the level W∗,
the lender unilaterally triggers sanctions: he expropriates the fraction β of
W∗ and reduces the growth rate of the borrower￿s risky technology to ￿ ￿.














We see, that the borrower￿s wealth level at which the lender triggers sanc-
tions is independent from the initial wealth of the borrower as well as the
contractual coupon ￿ow. What matters are the ￿nancial parameters ￿,σ,γ,
sanctions eﬀect (￿− ￿ ￿), collateralized fraction β and the bargaining cost bc.
From (31) it follows that the trigger boundary W∗ decreases with the liqui-
dation strength of the lender: the higher (￿−￿ ￿) or the higher β, the lower is
W∗. The same is true for the bargaining power parameter α15. The opposite
eﬀect holds for the borrower￿s risk aversion parameter γ and the lender￿s
bargaining cost bc. For example, when bc =0 , the lender will not ￿liqui-
date￿ the contract until the wealth of the borrower becomes equal to zero.
In that case, the value of the collateral is also equal to zero at liquidation.
4.4 The default boundary and the initial optimal policies
Knowing the value function of the sovereign country during the renegotiation
period, we are able to de￿ne the default boundary W∗ as well as optimal
consumption and investment policies.
First, we evaluate the optimal consumption at the default boundary W∗.




Using boundary condition (9.2), it can be written:
c∗(W∗)= l i m
W→W∗
+









γ = ￿ δW∗ (32)
15Notice that α cannot become arbitrary small. As we have already mentioned, it must
be bounded from below for the renegotiations to take place.
16F r o mt h i sp o i n to nw eu s es u p e r s c r i t pf o rc o n s u m p t i o nf u n c t i o nt oi n d i c a t ei t so p t i -
mality.
19Now, we can evaluate equations (21) and (24) at W∗. Given (32), we get a






































Notice that, as required, constant B is negative. By examining the value
of the default boundary, we see that it is independent from the initial wealth
of the sovereign borrower, but depends on the ￿nancial parameters (￿,σ,r)
and the preferences of the borrower (γ,ρ). Obviously, it also depends on the
value of the collateralized fraction β, sanctions eﬀect (￿ − ￿ ￿)a n dt h eb a r -
gaining power parameter α. As one can see, the higher the cost of sanctions
￿−￿ ￿ and the higher the fraction β of borrower￿s wealth the lender can seize,
the lower is the default boundary W∗, i.e. the later the sovereign country
defaults. The same relationship is true for the bargaining parameter α:t h e
borrower will default later if he is weaker during renegotiations. On the
other hand the default boundary W∗ increases with a contractual coupon
￿ow ﬂ C.
As an example, we consider an extreme case when the lender can neither
punish the borrower nor seize collateral in the case of default. In our
framework this implies that sanctions aﬀect ￿ − ￿ ￿ = ∆￿ → 0, and the
collateralized fraction β → 0. Then it follows from (34) that W∗ tends
to in￿nity. Under these circumstances, no rational lender will sign such a
contract because the default will be immediate.
Below we give an implicit solutions for optimal consumption and optimal
investment in the risky technology. Optimal consumption depends on wealth

















20Unfortunately, we cannot say a lot about optimal consumption and invest-
ment strategies when analyzing (35) and (36). Since consumption as a func-
tion of wealth has to be solved numerically, we postpone the detailed analysis
till section 6. The only thing we can examine now is an asymptotic behavior
















We can see that as wealth approaches in￿nity optimal consumption becomes
proportional to the net wealth of the borrower17 and the fraction invested
in the risky technology approaches Merton￿s rate.
5 Valuation of the risky loan
As Chang and Sundaresan (1999), we assert that at time 0, when the risky
loan is initiated, it must be that the borrower￿s valuation of the loan I(.)
satis￿es the following ￿xed-point requirement:
I(x0 + I∗)=I∗ (37)
where I∗ is the initial borrowing amount. This requirement can be justi￿ed
as follows. If the borrower￿s valuation of the loan (i.e. the present value of
future possible payouts) is above the actual amount he borrows, then, given
t h ef a c tt h a ti m m e d i a t ed e f a u l ti sn o ti n c e n t i v e - c o m p a t i b l e ,n ob o r r o w i n g
will take place. On the other hand, if the opposite inequality holds, then the
lender, who is assumed to have all the information about the borrower, will
reduce the amount of the loan I∗ such that requirement (37) is satis￿ed.
The value of the risky loan I(.) is a function contingent on the wealth of
the sovereign W, i.e. I = I(W). Following Merton (1974,1990), who derived
the partial diﬀerential equation for the value of corporate liability, it can be
shown that in the continuation region, i.e. when W>W ∗, the value of the
loan I(W)s a t i s ￿es the following ordinary diﬀerential equation:
1
2
σ2w∗2W2IWW +[ rW − ﬂ C − c∗(W)]IW − rI + ﬂ C = 0 (38)
17We de￿ne the net wealth as a diﬀerence between the current wealth of the sovereign
and the present value of the riskless loan. Since at in￿nitely high wealth the probability
of default is approaching zero, the value of the loan is approaching its risk-free value of
ﬂ C







where c∗ and w∗ are given by (35),(36), and ￿ I(W) is the value of the loan in
the renegotiation region. The ￿rst boundary condition is the value matching
condition and the second one indicates that the value of the risky loan cannot
exceed the value of the similar riskless loan. The last condition is a smooth-
pasting condition.
We solve equation (38) in a similar way we solved the HJB equation for
the initial value function J(W). Namely, we switch to optimal consumption
as an exogenous variable. Then18,
IW = Icc0(W)a n dIWW = Icc(c0(W))2 + Icc00(W) (39)
If we substitute the expression for w∗, which is given by (36), derivatives of
I, which are given by (39), and the expression for [rW − ﬂ C −c∗(W)], which

















cIc − rI + ﬂ C =0
The general solution to this equation is of the form:
I(c)=A1c−γh+ + A2c−γh− +
ﬂ C
r
where, to remind, h−,h + are the roots of the equation:λ2
2 h2−(r−ρ− λ2
2 )h−
r =0 . From the second boundary condition (38.1) it follows that A2 =0 .






where as before c∗(W) is given by (35), and the constant A1 will be de￿ned
through the value matching condition (38.1). This constant is required to
be positive due to the second condition in (38.1).
18For notational convenience we omit superscripts for optimal consumption. We will
resume to use it when we arrive to the ￿nal result.
22In general, the value of the risky loan is equal to:
I =( 1− p) •
ﬂ C
r
+ p • PVCFD
where p is the probability of future default,
ﬂ C
r is the present value of the
riskless loan and PVCFD is the present value of the cash ￿ow given that









The second term on the right hand side is nothing else as the present value
of the expected loss (EL) given default:





From equation (40), it follows that in our case the present value of expected
loss from default is:
EL = A1 [c∗(W)]
−γh+ (40.1)
5.1 The renegotiations period
As we have already discussed, during the renegotiation period the borrower
pays a strategic coupon ￿ow of αSmax(W) and the lender￿s net cash in￿ow
is equal to αSmax(W) − bc. Again, applying Merton￿s (1974) approach, it
can be shown that in the renegotiation period the value of the loan ￿ I must
satisfy the following ordinary diﬀerential equation:
1
2
σ2 ￿ w∗2W2￿ IWW +[ rW − aSmax(W) − ￿ c∗(W)]￿ IW − r￿ I + αSmax(W) − bc =0
(41)
where ￿ c∗(W), ￿ w∗ and Smax(W)a r ed e ￿ned by (30) and (27). Substituting
these values into (41), we obtain a linear diﬀerential equation for the value




γ2W2￿ IWW +[ r − as − ￿ δ]W ￿ IW − r￿ I + sW − bc = 0 (42)
The general solution to this diﬀerential equation is of the form:
￿ I(W)=A3Wz− + A4Wz+ +
s













γ2]z − r =0
Given the functional form for the value of the loan in the renegotiation
region (43) and the one in the continuation region (40), the constants A1,A 3
and A4 are uniquely de￿ned from the following system of linear algebraic
equations:
￿ I(W∗)=I(W∗) (value matching condition at W∗) (44)
￿ IW(W∗)=IW(W∗) (smooth-pasting condition at W∗)
￿ I(W∗)=βW∗ (boundary condition at W∗)
Therefore, at time 0 the value of the loan is given by equation (40),
where A1 is derived from (1).
5.2 Contractual coupon ﬂ C(I∗) and the default premium
T h ea m o u n tt ob eb o r r o w e da tt i m e0m u s ts a t i s f yt h e￿xed point require-
ment (37), and hence using (40) we obtain the equation for I∗:





where the optimal consumption at time 0 is derived from (35):







= x0 + I∗
After simple algebraic manipulations, we obtain that the contractual coupon
















where the expression in brackets on the right hand side is nothing else as
the optimal consumption at time 0: c∗(x0 + I∗) > 0. It is easy to see that
equation (46) also gives an implicit solution for the default premium which
can be de￿ned as













Notice that A1 is required to be negative (and numerical results will support
this requirement), therefore the default premium Iπ is positive according to
the above formula.
The value of the debt contract at time zero I∗ allows us to derive the
initial credit spread . The latter is de￿ned as the diﬀerence between the
loan￿s yield and the risk-free rate:
spread =
ﬂ C(I∗)
I∗ − r (47)
In general, equation (46) is impossible to solve analytically for the contrac-
tual coupon ﬂ C(I∗), and hence for the credit spread. Therefore, in section 6
we present the results of numerical simulations and conduct the sensitivity
analysis. Let us just notice that, given formulae (40) and (40.1), the yield





where REL (relative expected loss) denotes the expected loss given default




6N u m e r i c a l r e s u l t s
In our numerical simulations we use the following benchmark values for the
parameters of the model:
Initial Wealth x0 =1
Coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion γ =2
Growth Rate of the Risky Technology ￿ =0 .1
Sanction Eﬀect ￿ − ￿ ￿ =0 .03
Risk Free Rate R =0 .04
Subjective Discount Factor ρ =0 .05
Volatility of the Risky Technology Returns σ =0 .20
Bargaining Cost for the Lender bc =0 .0002
Collateralized Fraction at Default β =0 .01
Bargaining Strength of the Lender α =0 .85
25At the beginning of our numerical simulations we de￿ne the conditions
under which the debt contract is feasible. Then we study optimal consump-
tion and investment rules for the sovereign borrower which are given by (35)
and (36). Finally, we present some results for initial credit spreads which
are given by (47).
6.1 Feasibility of debt contract
In our model the sovereign country is borrowing money at a rate which is
obviously above the risk free rate because of the default probability. But in
the same time it keeps a fraction of its wealth in reserves which in turn can
be invested at the risk free rate. In the ￿rst place, we would like to study
the conditions under which such behavior is feasible. Those conditions were
formalized in Assumption 1. Namely, for the debt contract to be signed at
time zero, it must be that both the borrower￿s and the lender￿s participating
conditions are satis￿ed.
For the sovereign country to have incentives to borrow it must be that
J(x0 + I∗) >J 0(x0)
Numerical analysis indicates that this condition implies that the borrowed
amount I∗ must be above a certain minimal level I∗
min. This means that for
very low loan values, the utility gain from borrowing is below the probable
loss in the case of default. The value of I∗
min is de￿ned from the equality
J(x0 + I∗
min)=J0(x0).
On the other hand, the lender will not provide funds if the augmented
wealth of the borrower is equal or above the corresponding default boundary.
He will lend only when
x0 + I∗ >W∗( ﬂ C(I∗))
As our numerical simulations indicate, the augmented wealth of the borrower
x0 + I∗ increases with I∗ at a lower rate than does the default boundary
W∗( ﬂ C(I∗)). Therefore, it must be that the value of the loan I∗ is below a
certain maximal level I∗
max. This maximal coupon value solves the following
equality: x0 + I∗
max = W∗( ﬂ C(I∗
max)).
To de￿ne how much the country gains from borrowing, as in Chang and
Sundaresan (2000) we de￿ne a relative ￿certainty equivalence￿ CE :
J(x0 + I∗)=J0(x0 • CE) ⇒ CE =
J−1
0 (J(x0 + I∗))
x0
26Obviously, the country will borrow if CE > 1.
With the benchmark parameter setting, we look for the range of con-
tractual loan values I∗ such that the above inequalities are satis￿ed. In
Table 3 we present the results of numerical solutions for diﬀerent values of
sanctions eﬀect ∆￿ = ￿ − ￿ ￿ and collateralized fraction β. We can see that
the higher the ￿liquidation￿ strength of the lender, i.e. the higher cost of
sanctions and the value of collateral, the higher the initial borrowing amount
I∗ must be in order for the contract to be originated. On ￿gure 1, we plot
CE as a function of the initial loan value I∗ for diﬀerent values of sanctions
eﬀect ∆￿ = ￿ − ￿ ￿ (￿ =0 .1) and collateralized fraction β. First, we would
like to notice that up to a certain value of the loan, the value of the cer-
tainty equivalence is less than one. This is due to the ￿xed cost of sanctions
∆￿ : whatever the amount borrowed, the cost of sanctions (i.e. the loss the
growth rate) remains the same. Therefore, for small values of the loan, the
loss in the growth rate due to sanctions is always greater then the bene￿ts
from strategic default. We can also observe that the cost of sanctions ∆￿
has much bigger impact on the contract space than the value of collateral
(see table 3 and ￿g.1).
The bargaining power parameter α also has an in￿uence on the contract
space. On ￿gure 2, we plot the relative certainty equivalence against con-
tractual loan value I∗ for diﬀerent values of α. We observe that the weaker
the lender, or equivalently the stronger the country during renegotiations,
the higher is the country￿s certainty equivalence at time 0. We can see that
when α =0 .8, the range for the feasible contractual loan values widens
substantially. To the contrary, when the lender is very strong during rene-
gotiations, i.e. when α =0 .95, then the borrower￿s certainty equivalence is





β =0 .01, ∆￿ =0 .03 0.2949 0.3407
β =0 .01, ∆￿ =0 .02 0.1949 0.2417
β =0 , ∆￿ =0 .03 0.2832 0.3293
6.2 Optimal consumption and investment
As we have already mentioned in section 4, when the wealth tends to in￿nity,
then the country tends to consume at a constant rate and its investment
in the risky technology tends to Merton￿s line. In order to study optimal
consumption and investment rules near the default boundary W∗, we solve
27numerically equation (35) for consumption and equation (36) for the risky
technology investment.
On ￿gure 3 and 4 we plot normalized consumption
c∗(W)
δW against wealth
in the vicinity of the default boundary. As we see, as wealth decreases,
consumption decreases as well up to a certain point. As wealth becomes
close to W∗, the borrower￿s consumption behavior reverses: the country
starts to gear up its consumption rate. This ￿nding corresponds to the one
of Chang and Sundaresan (2000). Also, we observe that near the default
boundary W∗ normalized consumption is higher when the cost of sanctions
∆￿ decreases (￿g.3). We can also see that the collateralized fraction β alone
has a weak eﬀect on consumption (￿g.4).
A similar phenomenon is happening to the risky investment fraction w.
Figure 5 shows that as wealth approaches the default boundary, the fraction
of wealth invested in the risky technology increases and goes above the Mer-
ton￿s line approaching unity. Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the
risky investment and the collateralized fraction β. We can see that similarly
to consumption, the value of implicit collateral has very little eﬀect on the
investment strategies of the country.
The described consumption-investment behavior of the sovereign bor-
rower implies that near the default boundary W∗ the country reduces its
reserves for risky investment and consumption purposes (see ￿gure 7). As
an example, in table 4 we present the dynamics of Russian international
reserves before the August 1998 crises. We can see that during the crisis
period Russia has reduced its international reserves by nearly 33%.
Table 4. Liquid international reserves of Russian Federation, monthly data for Jan.-Sept.










Source: The Central Bank of Russian Federation
286.3 Relative risk aversion
The fact that near the default boundary W∗ the country increases its risky
investment fraction and consumption rate can be explained by the fact that





decreases as wealth approaches W∗. Figures 8 and 9 show that for very high
wealth levels the RRA tends to its default-free value γ =2 . When wealth
decreases, the RRA increases up to a certain level (this is the so-called ￿ight
to quality region) and then begins to decrease very rapidly when wealth
is close to W∗ (Chang and Sundaresan (1999) call this as the collateral
dissipation region).
We can also observe that sanction eﬀect ∆￿ has stronger eﬀect on the
relative risk aversion (￿gure 8) than the value of the collateral (￿gure 9).
6.4 Credit spreads
It is clear that due to the default risk the debt contract￿s yield must be above
the risk-free rate. In other words, a rational lender will require a premium
over the risk-free rate for the risk undertaken. To de￿ne the initial credit
spread we ￿rst solve numerically equation (46) for the contractual coupon
ﬂ C(I∗), and then we apply formula (47). On ￿gure 10 we plot the initial
credit spread as a function of the contractual loan value I∗. We observe
that spreads increase with I∗ because the higher contractual loan value
pushes up the corresponding coupon, and hence the default boundary (see
(34)), and thus increases the probability of default. Again, we can see that
the sanctions eﬀect has stronger impact on credit spread than the value
of collateralized fraction β. On ￿gure 11 we depict the relationship between
credit spreads and the volatility of the country￿s risky production technology.
Clearly, the riskier the technology, the higher is the probability of default,
and thus spreads increase. Figure 12 shows that credit spreads increase
as the lender￿s bargaining power parameter α becomes smaller. Indeed, if
the lender knows that he has a weaker position during renegotiations, he
will require a higher premium ex-ante. Finally, on ￿gure 13 we plot credit
spreads against the country￿s wealth. We can see that credit spreads increase
substantially as the country approaches its default boundary. This fact,
together with our ￿nding that the country￿s international reserves diminish
substantially near the default boundary, con￿rm the empirical ￿nding of
29Duﬃe, Pedersen and Singleton (2003) about the inverse relationship between
the spreads of Russian GKO and Russian foreign currency reserves.
7 Concluding remarks
In the paper we characterized the behavior of the sovereign borrower who
borrows from abroad and in the same time invests at the risk free rate his
international reserves. We have derived the conditions under which such
kind of behavior is feasible. In the paper we show that the existence of
the threat of sanctions is a necessary condition for the contract space to be
non-empty. Else, we perform numerical simulations which indicate that the
opportunity for the lender to seize collateral does not play a crucial role in
contracting. Neither borrower￿s gains from the borrowing, nor credit spreads
change substantially when the value of collateral changes.
We formulated necessary conditions for the borrower and the lender to
sign debt contract at time 0, and also the condition for renegotiations to take
place when the borrower defaults. The existence of the risk-free lending
opportunities for the borrower allowed us to derive explicit and implicit
analytical solutions for the value function as well as optimal consumption
and investment strategies for the sovereign country. Also, we obtained the
analytical solution for the default boundary. We have shown that near the
default boundary the country gears up the consumption rate as well as the
risky technology investment fraction at the expense of available international
reserves.
To test our model empirically, one would need to estimate all its pa-
rameters. Even though this set of parameters is not very big, it might be
very diﬃcult to estimate some of them. For example, it may not be easy
to estimate the country￿s risk aversion parameter γ, to estimate the ex-ante
sanctions eﬀect ∆￿, the value of the collateralized fraction β, etcetera. We
also realize that the model is restricted by a set of assumptions about the val-
ues of certain parameters. Relaxing some of those assumptions, for instance
assumption 2, may lead to inability to solve the problem analytically.
Our model can be extended to the dynamic case, i.e. when repeated
borrowing is allowed, by following Chang and Sundaresan (2000). By doing
that one still can expect to obtain all the results in the analytical form. For
further research, it would be interesting to introduce asymmetric information
in the model, when, for example, the lender cannot perfectly observe the
initial wealth of the borrower or cannot monitor the borrower￿s wealth during
the renegotiation period.
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31Figure 1. Relative certainty equivalence as a function of the contractual loan value I∗ for
diﬀerent values of sanctions eﬀect ∆￿ = ￿− ￿ ￿ (￿ =0 .1) and collateralized fraction β.
All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
Figure 2. Relative certainty equivalence as a function of the contractual loan value I∗
for diﬀerent values of the bargaining power parameter α. All the other parameters are
benchmark ones.
32Figure 3. Normalized consumption as a function of country￿s wealth W for diﬀerent
values of sanctions eﬀect ∆￿ = ￿− ￿ ￿ (￿ =0 .1). When ∆￿ =0 .03 : I∗ =0 .3, ﬂ C =
0.0194;.when ∆￿ =0 .02 : I∗ =0 .2, ﬂ C =0 .012. All the other parameters are
benchmark ones.
Figure 4. Normalized consumption as a function of country￿s wealth W for diﬀerent values
of collateralized fraction β. All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
33Figure 5. Risky technology investment fraction ω as a function of country￿s wealth W for
diﬀerent values of sanctions eﬀect ∆￿ (￿ =0 .1). When ∆￿ =0 .03 : I∗ =0 .3, ﬂ C =
0.0194;.when ∆￿ =0 .02 : I∗ =0 .2, ﬂ C =0 .012. All the other parameters are
benchmark ones.
Figure 6. Risky technology investment fraction ω as a function of country￿s wealth W for
diﬀerent values of collateralized fraction β. All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
34Figure 7. The country￿s holdings in international reserves (in %) a function of wealth W
when ∆￿ =0 .03,I∗ =0 .3, ﬂ C =0 .0194 and the default boundary W∗ =0 .9361.
All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
Figure 8. The country￿s relative risk aversion as a function of wealth W for diﬀerent values
of sanctions eﬀect ∆￿ (￿ =0 .1). When ∆￿ =0 .03 : I∗ =0 .3, ﬂ C =0 .0194;.when
∆￿ =0 .02 : I∗ =0 .2, ﬂ C =0 .012. All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
35Figure 9. The country￿s relative risk aversion as a function of wealth W for diﬀerent
values of collateralized fraction β. All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
Figure 10. Credit spread as a function of the contractual loan value I∗ for diﬀerent values
of sanctions eﬀect ∆￿ (￿ =0 .1) and collateralized fraction β.
36Figure 11. Credit spread as a function of the contractual loan value I∗ for diﬀerent values
of volatility of the risky technology σ. All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
Figure 12. Credit spread as a function of the contractual loan value I∗ for diﬀerent values
of the bargaining power parameter α. All the other parameters are benchmark ones.
37Figure 13. Credit spread as a function of the country￿s wealth.W when ∆￿ =0 .03,I∗ =
0.3, ﬂ C =0 .0194 and the default boundary W∗ =0 .9361 All the other parameters are
benchmark ones.
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